From MAC to Wabisabi * Preamble - big-and-randomized * Wabisabi, from the ground up. * What the Wabisabi paper, and this article, do not cover * Signatures, keyed MACs and credentials * Creating a MAC * Algebraic MACs * Security notions needed for algebraic MACs used for anonymous credentials * Algebraic MAC attempt 1 * Algebraic MAC attempt 2
In the modern nation state, courts ("justice") operate with the threat of violence. The exact way a dispute is settled varies (jury, single judge, etc.), but the "finality" of the resolution they provide is based on the fact that the state asserts the final say, and
Outline: * Basic goal of 1-of-\(N\) ring signatures * Recap: the \(\Sigma\)-protocol * OR of \(\Sigma\)-protocols, CDS 1994 * Abe-Ohkubo-Suzuki (AOS) 2002 (broken version) * Security weaknesses * Key prefixing * Borromean, Maxwell-Poelstra 2015 * Linkability and exculpability * AND of \(\Sigma\)-protocols, DLEQ * Liu-Wei-Wong 2004 * Security arguments for the LWW LSAG * Back 2015; compression, single-use
How sure are you that the cryptography underlying Bitcoin is secure? With regard to one future development of Bitcoin's crypto, in discussions in public fora, I have more than once confidently asserted "well, but the Schnorr signature has a security reduction to ECDLP". Three comments on
Introduction This post was mostly prompted by a long series of discussions had online and in person with many people, including in particular Adam Back and Tim Ruffing (but lots of others!) - and certainly not restricted to discussions I took part in - about the tradeoffs in a version
"Here is a purse of monies ... which I am not going to give to you" - Edmund Blackadder P(o)ODLE, not POODLE This post, fortunately, has nothing to do with faintly ridiculous SSL 3 downgrade attacks. Irritatingly, our usage here has no made-up need for the parenthetical